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Review and Reply

On “The Politics of Oath-Taking”
David J. Wasserstein
This commentary responds to Marybeth Ulrich’s article “The Politics of Oath-Taking”
published in the Summer 2020 issue of Parameters (vol. 50, no. 2).

M

arybeth Ulrich’s article, “The Politics of Oath-Taking” raises
questions important to any democracy, especially to the United
States, and even more so, as she points out, as we navigate a
period of what Steven Metz in the same issue labels “the decline of
authority structures, political hyperpartisanship, and the coalescence
of new ethical structures” (“The Future of Strategic Leadership,”
Parameters, Summer 2020, 61). These questions touch on the obligations
of the citizen, the soldier, and the civil servant in relation to the state,
its governing institutions, and its orders. While she highlights problems,
her responses, however, do not resolve them but imply an ease about
solutions belied by thought and historical experience.
Two central issues stand out. In the first, Ulrich distinguishes
between what she labels professional and political oath-taking/takers.
And the second concerns the primacy of legal over other obligations.
As to Ulrich’s assertion of a difference between professional and
political oath-takers, the distinction is artificial at best, dangerous at
worst. The former are obliged to give impartial, nonpartisan service
to their country, while the latter give explicitly partisan support to
the political agenda for which they or those who appoint them are
elected. Ulrich mentions Ambassador William B. Taylor Jr. who took
an oath twice, once as a professional and later as a political appointee.
Her argument does not, however, draw any conclusions from his case,
which glides tellingly between her two positions. (It is also noteworthy
Taylor was, at over 70 years old, far from risking his career in defying a
presidential prohibition on testifying before Congress).
There is certainly a difference in the persons and the tasks involved.
Professional appointees are skilled experts possessed of relevant
qualifications for their jobs. Political appointees, by contrast, need not
have any special qualifications for their posts, beyond enjoying the
confidence of the president and, when relevant, winning Senate approval.
But no difference exists in the legal (and the moral/ethical) obligations
to the state and the people of this country that come with these jobs
and the oath, regardless of whether the oath-taker is a professional or a
political appointee. The real world does not alter these obligations.
The second issue is far larger than the first. The question is not
whether those who take oaths are obliged to follow through and obey
them. Obviously they are—except when they are not. The real question,
therefore, is when may they, when must they, not. The problem is very
often the answer to that question boils down to a matter of perception:
when do we, when must we, place our moral/ethical obligations above our
legal ones? When do we place our legal obligations as we understand
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them above our legal obligations as they are understood by others? And
when may government or the president compel such obedience?
These questions have worried and harried human beings for
millennia. Twenty-four centuries ago, Sophocles showed us Antigone, in
his play of that name, faced this central issue—in the terms of that time,
the law of the state versus the law of God—and offered one answer.
We admire her decision and her action, not least because it threatens to
cost her her life. But hers is not, or not always and not necessarily, the
only possible or right answer. This dilemma, rather than the answers
themselves, is why the decisions of now retired US Army Lieutenant
Colonel Alexander Vindman and Taylor are important. It is also why
those who think those decisions wrong are not so handily to be dismissed.
The questions matter not just in the personal realm, but also, as
Ulrich points out, in what she labels the “civil/military relations norms”
field. Like other Western nations, the United States is a democracy in
which the military is firmly subordinated to civilian control. We can
even say that to be a so-called Western nation, a state must subordinate
the military to civilian control. But as the current situation shows,
there may come times when devotion to country and the Constitution
demands an individual break an oath and disregard norms of civilmilitary relations. That devotion may demonstrate an oath—quite
apart from its legal aspects—is really just confirmation of a universal
obligation (The famous Great Loyalty Oath Campaign in Joseph Heller’s
Catch-22 is not irrelevant here).
It may occasionally, as the United States itself has asserted in
many countries around the world, be necessary to destroy democracy
temporarily in order to save it permanently (the example of the dictator
in ancient Roman legal tradition is pertinent here). If democracy or the
state is threatened from within by the actions of a commander in chief
gone wild and the civilian arm has no means or desire to remove that
individual, the military may have a responsibility—a loaded term—to
step in. That is what German officers (without Allied support) tried
and failed to do in 1944—far too late, for the wrong reasons, and
with terrible results for themselves. It is also, less admirably, what
Chilean General Augusto Pinochet—with American support—did in
Chile in 1973. The moral/ethical dilemmas for soldiers, as for others,
are complex.
Additionally, the obligations Ulrich describes in the oath-taking
of soldiers and public servants are not as special as she thinks. Oaths
simply add another layer of obligation to those that exist already under
the law. Being a soldier or a professional or political civil servant does
not exempt anyone—including the president—from the obligation to
obey the law.
Ulrich’s essay is timely and useful. The United States faces major
problems, especially internally, that confront citizens—soldiers,
professional civil servants, political appointees, everyone—with the
legal and moral challenges she addresses. How Americans face those
challenges will determine more than the careers of a few soldiers or
retired ambassadors. It will determine the future of the Constitution,
America’s system of checks and balances, and the place of the United
States in the world.
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On “The Politics of Oath-Taking”
Jimmie R. Montgomery, retired US Air Force colonel
This commentary responds to Marybeth Ulrich’s article “The Politics of Oath-Taking”
published in the Summer 2020 issue of Parameters (vol. 50, no. 2).

M

arybeth Ulrich’s article, “The Politics of Oath-Taking”
presents much to unpack and does more than promote the
idea that oath-takers are obligated to abide by their oaths.
Let me react. First, what American military officer would fail to support
democratic institutions and our constitutional processes? How is it
possible to allege such actions are a violation of our nonpartisan norms?
I reject that notion! Supporting our institutions is inherent in our duty.
Characterizing it as patriotic seems overkill. It is just expected.
I agree a military officer can testify before Congress if lawfully
subpoenaed. I do not agree with the assertion Congress is a “second
and coequal civilian master.” This assertion is a wholly different and
distracting inclusion. The Department of Defense is in the executive
branch. In her discussion regarding Constitutional foundations, Ulrich
cites herself in restating the theory of two masters. (I disapprove of the
term master in this context.) Then Ulrich asserts any action violating
constitutional norms violates our oath. I agree, but the challenge for us
all is the lack of clarity or consensus on such norms. Ulrich ignores this
challenge, and the fact she does not address it undermines her argument.
I have no heartburn with her paragraphs on the stated purpose
of the presidential impeachment inquiry or the distinction between
the two oath-taker types postulated. (I do have less confidence in our
nonmilitary oath-takers.) And the scholars cited, David Barno and
Nora Bensahel, warn of consequences resulting from a loss of trust
in our military institutions due to partisan activities by oath-takers.
The referenced article importantly notes such activities are not new.
(As an aside, does calling them scholars mean their views carry
extraordinary weight?)
Several paragraphs are spent building up Ambassador William B.
Taylor Jr. as a righteous example of a good, responsible oath-taker. I
would not argue with that conclusion. But citing Timothy O’Brien, a
well-known Democratic loyalist, undermines the buildup. Taylor, in
his testimony, was explicitly upset for two reasons. First, an irregular
channel of policy making was used by the administration. Frankly, get
over it. Taylor executes policy, and while he may have an input to the
policy process, he does not make it.
Second, Taylor asserted military aid he considered vital was being
withheld for “domestic political reasons.” It is worth noting the aid was
delayed about seven weeks. Taylor thought, as characterized by O’Brien,
the president was undermining the national interest. For me, Taylor’s
testimony before the impeachment inquiry was far from convincing.
No mention was made by Ulrich of Ambassador Gordon Sondland’s
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testimony/recollection, which was often at odds with Taylor’s. Perhaps
Sondland is not a good, responsible oath-taker.
Ulrich uses now retired US Army Lieutenant Colonel Alexander
Vindman as the second example of a good oath-taker. Again, Vindman
was responding to a lawful subpoena, and he should have testified. He
was not insubordinate. He did his duty. He expressed his judgments. I
listened to Vindman’s testimony and viewed his demeanor; he does not
lack self-confidence and was borderline arrogant in his responses. He
believed what he said. Whether his judgment was correct on what he
believes he heard in the phone conversation between the president of
Ukraine and US President Donald Trump will be evaluated by history.
Finally, I wholeheartedly disagree with the concluding assertion that
the current view of our military officers is that loyalty to the president
outweighs the duty to testify before Congress when lawfully subpoenaed.
(I had to smile at the use of “trumps” in the paragraph.) I agree a robust
education is needed on oath-taking, but the concluding paragraph in the
article should have been omitted. The tone is melodramatic.

The Author Replies
Marybeth P. Ulrich

I

n my essay, “The Politics of Oath-Taking,” I introduced the concept
of political oath-takers (political appointees) and professional oathtakers (civil servants including the uniformed military) and argued
understanding their constitutional obligation is uneven. I also raised the
basic question of whether participating in the constitutional process in
support of democratic institutions violated the professional military
norm of nonpartisanship. I concluded fulfilling one’s oath to the
Constitution, even if such an act was contrary to the commander-in-chief ’s
wishes, did not violate professional military norms. On the contrary, acts
such as now-retired US Army Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Vindman’s
testimony before the House of Representative’s impeachment inquiry
support Congress’s impeachment power to protect the presidency from
an occupant who may abuse presidential power. Several readers took
issue with some of the arguments raised. This brief essay seeks to address
their concerns.

Political versus Professional Oath-Takers

David Wasserstein writes the distinction I proposed between
professional and political oath-takers was “artificial at best, dangerous
at worst.” He went on to offer a distinction, “The former are obliged
to give impartial, nonpartisan service to their country, while the latter
give explicitly partisan support to the political agenda for which they or
those who appoint them are elected.” This definition is in fact consistent
with my own, but I also emphasize whether or not the role is a partisan
one, the obligation to uphold the oath is the same. As such, political
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oath-takers cannot be excused from not following their oaths simply
because they are political appointees.
Members of Congress are political oath-takers who have a
particular obligation beyond political appointees. As elected officials,
they are accountable to their constituents and are ascribed specific
constitutional powers in order to check executive power. Members of
Congress who choose to attack the character of witnesses and engage in
hyperpartisan rhetoric, instead of questioning professional oath-takers
on the issue at the heart of the inquiry, abdicate their constitutional
responsibility. Professional oath-takers offer the nonpartisan objectivity
critical to establishing the truth. Members of Congress true to their oaths
balance their partisan loyalties with their constitutional obligation to
check a president who abuses the power of his or her office. Unfortunately,
the impeachment inquiry featured a number of politicians unable to
exercise the restraint necessary to conduct an objective proceeding
capable of producing the constitutional remedy the founders intended.
The readers criticize Ambassador William B. Taylor Jr. and Vindman
for interjecting their policy expertise into the proceedings. It is important
to clarify the responsibility that career national security professionals,
both uniformed and civilian, have in the process. Vindman and Taylor
both possessed expert professional knowledge relevant to the inquiry
uniquely acquired through their national service. Professional norms
and the oaths of each man to the Constitution required such expertise
be shared in the form of professional advice with the executive and
Congress. Indeed, as part of the confirmation process senior military
officers promise to be forthright when questioned before Congress.
Jimmie R. Montgomery rejects the “two masters” argument that the
military is subject to the control of both the president and the Congress,
citing the fact the Department of Defense is part of the executive
branch. This position highlighted the president’s commander-in-chief
role atop the military chain of command but did not pay sufficient
attention to the founders’ intent to place significant authority to fund,
regulate, and even create military forces, such as the nascent Space
Force, uniquely in Congress’s hands.
Montgomery also took issue with Vindman’s demeanor while
testifying, chiding him for arrogance. I witnessed some of my War
College students raising such objections, including the critique he
wore his uniform to testify. Vindman responded he was testifying in
his professional capacity. His choice was in line with Army regulations
and the norm that active duty officers testify in uniform. Critics may
dispute his preference, but focusing on his attire and demeanor detracts
from full consideration of the issues at the center of the inquiry.

Implications

Vindman retired from the Army in the aftermath of President
Donald Trump’s attempt to deny him promotion to full colonel and
Army officials’ communication to him his future assignments would
be restricted. Vindman determined his Army career was no longer
viable, ultimately sacrificing his career for remaining loyal to his oath.
Vindman told the Atlantic, “I had to choose between the president and
the Constitution. I was aware of the fact that I could be compelled to
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testify. But I chose the Constitution. No Army officer wants to be put in
that position, but there I was” (Jeffrey Goldberg, “Alexander Vindman:
Trump is Putin’s ‘Useful Idiot,’ ” Atlantic, September 14, 2020). Given
the inability of the secretary of defense to protect Vindman sufficiently
from retaliation for his participation in the impeachment query, future
professional oath-takers may not choose a path of government service if
such a choice is perceived to be career ending.
The founders understood merely stating the rules of the
game in the Constitution would not be enough. They also thought it
was important to socially construct an emotional commitment to the
document—the oath—in order to buttress the rules with supporting
norms. But the current American political scene lacks oath-takers in
sufficient numbers who understand the obligations of their oath and
its associated norms for civil-military relations in a democracy. Without
such understanding those “who choose loyalty to American values
and allegiance to the Constitution” may be punished, contributing to
the further erosion of democratic institutions (Alexander Vindman,
“Alexander Vindman: Coming Forward Ended My Career. I Still Believe
Doing What’s Right Matters,” Washington Post, August 1, 2020).

